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Abstract
?Sharp Power? is a concept proposed by International Forum for Democratic Studies in ????. It 
refers to a regime?s ability to influence perceptions of audiences in a target country in order to change 
their minds and behavior, undermine the political system and thus shape favorable consensus, by ma-
nipulative use of information. ?Sharp power? is conceived to expose influence-expansion behavior 
from authoritarian states, such as China. Taking China as a typical sample, this article explores fea-
tures of ?sharp power? according to its definition, and then specifies China?s behaviors under the con-
text of sharp power. The article finds that the concept of ?sharp power? has its fatal deficiencies in four 
aspects: (?) its unclear boundary with soft power and hard power; (?) its unnecessity due to overlap 
characteristics with the existing concept of ?smart power?; (?) its ideology-led essence disguised in 
academic terminology; and (?) its ineffective countermeasure to deal with the real threat. The article 
also provides two alternative approaches to explain the so-called ?sharp power? of China: (?) strategic 
narratives, and (?) norm diffusion. The former suggests that China?s influence-expansion behaviors are 
the state?s projection of ?strategic narratives? to gain international supports; while the latter suggests 
that China is spreading its norms which rooted in its traditional culture to shape a China-led new world 
order as a rising normative power. Therefore, China?s ?sharp power? is, essentially, the unsuccessful 
strategic narratives and norm diffusions which are unacceptable by Western audiences or even uncon-
vincing in its domestic contexts. 
Introduction 
As a rising great power, China is not only challenging current world order with its fast-grow-
ing economic strength, widespread overseas investment, burgeoning military force, and progress-
ing technology, but is also ardently expanding its foreign influence in international arena, which 
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can be noticed in its propaganda tone, foreign policy adjustment and public diplomacy efforts. 
China?s increasing transnational influence on values, norms, politics, and culture, etc., 
namely, its soft power, has caught deep vigilance by Western countries. Besides China?s formida-
ble military budget (a yearly growth rate at ?%) and deployment of new weapons (J-?? stealth 
fighter, aircraft carrier, etc.), Westerners are now worried about an invisible, non-traditional threat 
from this Eastern rising power––its authoritarian influence, or ?sharp power?, which might erode 
democratic values in Western society.
Sharp power is a nascent notion to interpret how authoritarian states, such as China and 
Russia, achieve their goal of affecting targeted foreign audiences via the manipulation of informa-
tion, albeit in an ?unattractive? way relative to soft power. This notion is used to accuse China of 
spreading its values towards Western academics, think tanks, media, politicians, education systems 
by virtue of government-sponsored illicit measures, such as the establishment of Confucius 
Institutes in worldwide?. Meanwhile, China also refuted this notion in several public occasions, 
academia, and official media, blaming that sharp power is a ?pseudo-academic concept? which 
proves Western biases towards China?. 
This article provides two alternative explanations for China?s practice of spreading national 
influence abroad, which is not merely the projection of its ?sharp power?, but instead, can also be 
regarded as ?strategic narratives? or ?norm diffusion?.  
The article will first introduce the definition and characteristics of ?sharp power?, and then 
illustrate its distinction with soft power, specify China?s behaviors under the context of sharp pow-
er. Next, the article would refute the concept of sharp power from four aspects: its blurring catego-
rization, its unnecessity, its politicized essence, and its ineffective countermeasure. For the further 
step, the article will provide the alternative explanations of China?s behavior in this case with 
?Strategic Narratives Theory?, which attributes sharp power to China?s narrative-projection to 
achieve specific political aim both at home and abroad?; or ?Norm Diffusion?, suggesting the 
sharp power results from China?s rise as a normative power.
A. What is Sharp Power 
?Sharp power? is a term proposed by Washington-headquartered think tank, International 
Forum for Democratic Studies, in November of ????. In a ???-page report, the think tank put for-
ward the notion of ?sharp power?, which refers to the ability to influence audiences through effort 
that ?pierces, penetrates, or perforates the political and information environments in the targeted 
countries??. China and Russia are the two typical authoritarian states that are labeled with ?sharp 
power?. The report alleged that Beijing and Moscow have spent billions of dollars in propaganda 
to exert their national influence outward, to ?shape public opinion and perceptions? that are in fa-
vor their authoritarian values in democratic societies?. Four case studies in ?young democracies? 
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(Peru, Argentina, Poland, and Slovakia), which are ?Free? but also vulnerable to authoritarian con-
trol, were examined?. As the report traced, public sphere of these regions was invaded by China 
and Russia in four vital specific spheres which are critical in the shaping of public opinion and 
perceptions: (?) media, (?) academia, (?) culture, and (?) the think tank and policy communities?. 
The projection of sharp power can harm these young democratic societies with authoritarian ?un-
attractive values? that encourage ?a monopoly on power, top-down control, censorship, and co-
erced or purchased loyalty??.
Since the issue of that ?sharp power? report, a bunch of commentary articles or academic 
papers about Chinese and Russian sharp power (especially Chinese sharp power) emerged. The 
angle of analysis was no longer confined in ?young democracies?, but also spread to the whole 
Western society. In December of ????, The Economist introduced China?s sharp power in its cover 
article, arousing a rising concern over Chinese influence in Australia and other Western countries?. 
Joseph Nye, the originator of ?soft power?, also published several articles to discuss China?s sharp 
power, indicating that China is trying to exert ?strong narrative? as a source of power, but its soft 
power generated by economic success is limited??. He argues that sharp power, utilized in a coer-
cive rather than persuasive way, is threatening soft power??.
In summary, ?sharp power? is a regime?s ability to influence perceptions of audiences in a 
target country in order to change their minds and behavior, undermine the political system and 
thus shape favorable consensus, by manipulative use of information. This term is conceived to ex-
pose influence-expansion behavior from authoritarian states, such as China.
1. Sharp Power and Soft Power & Hard Power
A common theme for researches of ?sharp power? is this term?s distinction and connection 
with ?soft power?. Besides, the seemingly opposite notion ––?hard power?–– is also discussed in 
the debate of categorization of sharp power.
Sharp power is distinguished from soft power, even though they have the identical aim: to 
change and influence social and public opinion in exchange for a desirable outcome; they adopt 
similar tools: culture, values and policies; and they always share the same vehicle for information 
circulation: such as mass media, cultural markets, education system, public diplomacy, etc. 
The very basic and the largest distinction of sharp power comparing to soft power is coer-
civeness. Soft power emphasizes ?attraction? rather than ?coercion or payment??? as a means of 
persuasion; while sharp power, on the contrary, centers on ?distraction and manipulation???. Sharp 
power gets its ?sharpness? in that authoritarian regimes ?pierce, penetrate, or perforate? in the po-
litical or information environments of target countries??, rather than appeal or attract the 
audiences.
Also, despite the similarities of coerciveness, sharp power is different from hard power. The 
use of hard power is exemplified by coercive diplomacy, military intervention and economic 
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sanction, which rely on ?tangible? power resources military strength and economic might??. Sharp 
power, nevertheless, always entails a degree of ?stealth???. In an information age, the easy accessi-
bility of information through the Internet makes sharp power even more ?intangible?, and there-
fore more distinctive from hard power.
As a result, sharp power has common features with both soft & hard power, but it also dis-
tinguishes from soft power due to its coerciveness, and from hard power for its intangibility.
2. China?s Practice of Sharp Power
China is alleged to vigorously attempt to spread its influence in the global wide. Its purpose, 
according to the sharp power report, is to ?reduce, neutralize, or preempt? challenges to the 
Chinese regime and Communist Party of China (CCP) in any sorts. By utilizing instruments of 
manipulation and censorship, authoritarian regimes like China could not only ?suppress political 
pluralism and free expression? at home for the surety of regime, but also ?applying the same prin-
ciples internationally? to gain greater advantaged influence??.
Beijing is blamed to systematically implement its sharp power in the globe. Its efforts in 
transnational cultural activities, people-to-people exchange, educational program and development 
of international media enterprises are all functioned or potential ?toolkit? of its sharp power??. 
Among the diverse implementations, the most remarkable one is the establishment of Confucius 
Institutes, a public educational organization affiliated with the Ministry of Education of China, in 
a wide range of countries. Confucius Institutes aims at promoting Chinese language and culture at 
a global scale, but is also charged as an exercise to expand China?s political influence through the 
way of ?soft power???. This official-sponsored organization network grew rapidly around the 
world, and it harmed academic freedom on campus within democratic societies, for its financial 
pressure, encouragement of self-censorship and avoidance of sensitive issues in China (e.g. 
Taiwan, Tibet issues)??. Through these methods, foreign audiences are more prone to accept 
China?s one-sided framing of sensitive topics, sketch a favorable Chinese image and sympathize 
the regime??. Even further, The Economist demonstrated that Confucius Institutes, which were soft 
power initially, is getting ?sharper? for the attempt to convince students in the West that ?China?s 
authoritarianism is admirable?, tempting them to try such political system and value in their own 
countries??.
Besides, China is also wielding is sharp power by ?aggressive investment, co-optation, and 
dishonest salesmanship???. Its sharp power has not only penetrated young democracies in Latin 
America and Central/Eastern Europe, but also pierced barrier of mature Western democratic states. 
Australia has proposed a new law to tackle challenges to the state?s politics, universities, and pub-
lishing from China?s interference at an ?unprecedented and increasingly sophisticated? scale. 
Other Western states including the United States, Britain, Germany, and New Zealand are also act-
ing against China?s growing influence ??. For instance, on October ?, ????, Mike Pence, Vice 
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President of the United States, delivered a speech to accuse China of meddling in US elections. 
Although he didn?t mention ?sharp power? directly, he adopted the same notion by blaming China 
for its actions ?to advance its influence and benefit its interests in the United States?. Pence 
warned that China is wielding its power ?in more proactive ways? to interfere with US domestic 
issues. Besides economic, political and military tools, as Pence stated, Beijing is also ?spending 
billions of dollars on propaganda outlets? in both the US and around the world, by means of 
Communist Party-led propaganda media (such as the China Radio International and the China 
Global Television Network) to spread ?Beijing-friendly? programmes??.
B. Deficiencies of Sharp Power 
The notion ?sharp power? successfully raised concern over China?s authoritarian influence 
globally. However, as a policy-oriented terminology (and potentially an academic one), it has sev-
eral fatal flaws: (?) its ambiguous categorization between soft power and hard power, as well as 
the lack of explicit criteria for evaluation; (?) its repetition of existing issues; (?) its overemphasis 
on ideological and political connotation and (?) its invalid solutions suggested by researchers. 
1. Blurring Power: Soft or Hard 
According to the initial report which put forward the concept of ?sharp power?, sharp power 
refers to authoritarian ?soft power??? from Russia and China. Although the report admitted there 
are differences between the two powers, it also stated that the implementations of sharp power are 
understood in the familiar context of ?soft power???. Thus, Beijing and Moscow?s attempts to exert 
sharp power is actually ?leveraging and repurposing traditional tools of ?soft power???.
The concept of soft power, as the report suggested, need to be ?reconceptualized?. It argued 
that soft power is a ?conceptual vocabulary? that has been used ?since the end of Cold War?, and 
is insufficient enough to explain present situations. It also challenged ?soft power? by claiming it a 
?catch-all? term which describes all powers that don?t belong to ?hard power?. Consequently, it 
depicted sharp power as the one that neither ?soft? with attraction, nor ?hard? with openly coercive 
sense??.
Joseph Nye, nonetheless, implied that there is no need to re-think about the concept of ?soft 
power?, which he proposed in ????, because sharp power is essentially a type of hard power??. As 
stated by Nye, sharp power is ?the deceptive use of information for hostile purposes?, which con-
tains the element of payments and coercion. Although sharp power can disrupt democratic pro-
cesses and tarnish democracy, it can barely enhance soft power. Nye pointed out that even though 
China gained some benefits by using its tools in Australia, it is now set back. Also, in spite of bil-
lions of dollars which were paid to promote soft power, China received very limited achievement, 
ranking at ??th among ?Soft Power ??? index ranks??.
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These conflicting arguments reveal the blurriness of sharp power. Sharp power is described 
as neither hard nor soft according to the sharp power report but is regarded as totally hard power 
by Joseph Nye. The haziness of boundaries between hard and soft power makes sharp power a 
vague vocabulary, which has both soft part and hard part but can hardly be classified into either 
field. Therefore, accepting the concept of ?sharp power? brings the risk of undermining the logical 
self-consistency of soft & hard power. 
Another factor that contributes to sharp power?s ambiguity lies at the difficulty of determin-
ing which power is ?sharp?. Since sharp power is usually mingled with soft power, it is not easy to 
recognize a coercive power from powers that are appealing. The sharp power report admitted that 
citizens in young democratic societies are often ?unaware of the extent to which civil society is 
tightly controlled inside China???. The Economist also agreed that Confucius Institutes are soft 
power tools, even though they are potential sharp powers. The magazine listed some shreds of evi-
dence to justify the conclusion that ?Confucius Institutes have turned sharper?, for instance, more 
universities have replaced their own language courses by the institutes?, and these courses usually 
?restrain debate? about sensitive issues concerning to China??. Nye suggested that it is unreason-
able to prohibit China?s soft power efforts, but it is crucial to ?monitor the dividing line carefully?. 
A Confucius Institute, for instance, should be closed once it shows an inclination to restrict aca-
demic freedom??.
 However, due to the absence of a clear line among powers, there remains a large vacuum 
space to assess: To what extent should a behavior be identified as ?sharp power?? According to 
what standards should a government take action to suppress sharp power? Which individual or en-
tity should be charged with wielding sharp power?
2. Cliché: “A New Term for Old Threat” 
Sharp power is not a threat abruptly emerged in recent years, but a long-existing issue since 
the ??th century. Nye illustrated that sharp power is a ?new term that describes an old threat?. 
Similar information manipulation practice had been conducted by both the US and Soviet Union 
during the Cold War era. Today?s ?information warfare? launched by China and Russia has its 
roots in history, since authoritarian regimes have constantly tried to disgrace democracy via ?fake 
news and social disruption???.
The escalating attention on sharp power is an inevitable consequence of globalization in the 
information age. Cyber technology allows speedy and dynamic circulation of information in global 
wide, thus can also strengthen countries? efficiency to expand their values outward for both au-
thoritarian regime and democracy with equal chance. Additionally, the rise of China in both hard 
and soft national power, plus the relative decline of democracy in the whole Western world, ampli-
fied the seeming threat of non-Western values that penetrate democratic communities.
Furthermore, as mentioned above, so-called sharp power attaches characteristics of both 
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hard power and soft power, but also distinct from either. Undoubtedly, among various definitions 
and debates about sharp power, no one can avoid the discussion of the relationship of sharp power 
with soft & hard power. 
In every sense, sharp power is not an isolated notion, but a derivative product of soft power 
and hard power. Sharp power, when implemented, is disguised in the form of soft power and share 
the same strategic aim with it; meanwhile, it needs the support of hard power (such as economic 
might) to supplement its unattractiveness, in order to achieve the effect of persuasion. From this 
perspective, sharp power can be regarded as the combination of hard & soft power, which is, 
coined in ????, as ?smart power???. Nye indicated that soft power alone cannot produce effective 
foreign policy, thus strategies to combine the tools of both soft and hard power are required. This 
is even more paramount in today?s information age, since in the current world, success is no longer 
merely the result of ?whose army wins?, but also of ?whose story wins???.
To some extent, the practice of sharp power, therefore, is nothing but the usage of ?smart 
power? by authoritarian states. As Nye stated, what new is ?not model? but the speed of informa-
tion dissemination??. Hence, sharp power is merely old wine in a new bottle. When previous termi-
nologies, i.e. smart power, are still able to explain current affairs, it is a waste to invent new 
jargons which lack solid supporting ground.
3. “China Threat 2.0”: A Politicized Concept
The strongest response from China is the criticism of the new ?China Threat? tone raised by 
sharp power.
Chinese propaganda institutions, officials, and scholars regarded the term of sharp power as 
a new round of ?China threat? which started from ????s??, as well as a new ?demonizing tool? 
against China??. It also criticized that unlike hard power and soft power, sharp power is a ?pseudo-
academic concept? that full of Western biases??. During a press conference on March ?, ????, 
Wang Guoqing, spokesman of National Committee of the Chinese People?s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), refuted the idea of sharp power for its ?double standard? and ?Cold War 
thinking?, indicating that China?s behavior is the same as Western?s soft power and smart power??. 
China has also been worried about the penetration of Western ideologies and values for a 
long while, both before and after its normalization of relationship with US-led ?Capitalist Camp? 
since the ????s. Western-styled ?universal values?, including freedom, democracy, and constitu-
tionalism, etc., are called tools of ?peaceful evolution? in Chinese political discourse, which can 
be utilized by politicians to harm China?s socialist system, spoil Marxism?s dominant position in 
national ideology, or even cause regime change by destabilizing CCP?s one-party leadership??. 
These Western values are often recognized by Chinese political leaders and scholars as one of the 
factors that caused the fall of Berlin Wall, Soviet Union?s collapse, as well as China?s domestic po-
litical turbulence (Tiananmen Incident in ????). In the early stage of Xi?s era in ????, only four 
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years earlier before the birth of ?sharp power?, concerns over Western ?peaceful evolution? was 
still noticeable in China. ?Silent Contest? (jiao liang wu sheng) is a documentary produced by the 
People?s Liberation Army?s National Defense University Information Management Center in late 
October of ????. The film exposed that the US has never stopped waging a propaganda war 
against China, in seek of regime change and territorial division, by means of political/cultural/ide-
ological/social infiltration, political interference and ?Westernization of China???. This hawkish 
documentary, which also politicized the concept of ?soft power?, reflected Chinese conventional 
anxiety of ?soft war methods? from the US. Nevertheless, such anxiety has been transferred to the 
West, in a form of China?s ?peaceful evolution?, or perhaps, China?s ?sharp power?.
Indeed, the term ?sharp power? was initiated from a politicized context, which emphasized 
the borderline between the authoritarian regime and democratic politics, and targeted specifically 
at China and Russia. The ongoing debates over ?sharp power? implicated controversies of this na-
scent concept. Accepting ?sharp power? as an academic terminology can bring risks, since it lacks 
clear evaluation criteria to identify powers, but simply drawing an ideological line between West 
and East.
4. Poor Tactics: Openness against Sharpness 
The Western societies have raised sufficient awareness of sharp power?s destructive capacity 
but proposed a few effective methods to prevent it. So far, a common tactic against sharp power 
that agreed by liberalistic scholars is insisting openness in a democratic community. The 
Economist suggested that open societies could ?ignore China?s sharp power at their peril?, and the 
West should ?use its own values to blunt China?s sharp power???. Nye also demonstrated that open-
ness is a ?key source of democracies? ability to attract and persuade?, thus democracies, with soft 
power in hand, should not fear of open competition with authoritarian sharp power??.
Unfortunately, openness is also the key factor for non-democratic regimes to exert their in-
fluence. In public debate, it is hard to detect sharp power within normal democratic processes, let 
alone take preemptive action before that power takes effect and becomes pervasive. If openness 
can really overcome sharpness, influence-expansion programs from authoritarian states (i.e. sharp 
power) should not raise a concern or even panic in Western societies. Since openness provides 
space for not only democratic values? circulation but also for sharp power?s penetration and diffu-
sion, keeping open without any further valid preventive action is no different from laissez-faire.
Admittedly, China is now ardently eager for expanding its influence, both hard and soft, to 
the outside world. The scenario of China?s influence-promotion strategy is performing in a para-
doxical style, which is notably obvious in Xi Jinping?s era: on the one hand, CCP tightened the 
party?s leadership in various fields including ideology, culture, and education, suppressing the 
freedom of speech and diversity of values in public sphere even further compared to previous 
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administrations of Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin, and Deng Xiaoping after Mao Zedong?s death; on the 
other hand, China encourages domestic propaganda, media, cultural & educational departments 
?going outward? to strengthen China?s soft power overseas, claiming that China embraces the 
openness for both free trade and cultural communication with the whole world.
These self-contradictory declarations and actions reflect the need for CCP to legitimize its 
rules after the power transition in ???? to ensure stability at home, as well as the demand for en-
hancing the country?s comprehensive power in the international arena as an ambitious rising pow-
er. Such distinct features make China?s influence-expansion blueprint dissimilar to its Western 
counterparts?, but it can still be regarded as an approach of ?smart power?, which combines 
China?s growing economic & military power and the use of soft influence, though adhered by au-
thoritarian ?sharpness?.
C. Alternative Explanations in Current Context
Besides ?smart power?, there are two potential theories that can interpret China?s current be-
haviors for boosting its foreign influence: strategic narratives, which illustrates the role of ?story-
telling? in international relations; and norm diffusion, which explores how norms can shape world 
order. 
1. Strategic Narratives: Telling China?s Story
?Strategic narratives? refers to a means for political actors to ?construct a shared meaning of 
past, present, and future of international politics to shape the behavior of domestic and internation-
al actors?, by which the narrators can ?extend their influence, manage expectations and change the 
discursive environment in which they operate?.??
As Nye stated, power sometimes depends not merely on ?whose army or economy wins?, 
but also ?whose story wins???. Parallelly arranged, China is now projecting its own strategic narra-
tives to build solid national identity domestically, and seek to shape order, changing system 
internationally??.
The prior domestic narrative, in Xi?s era, is ?Chinese Dream?, which targets at realizing 
?great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation???. Following this grand aim, other following slogans 
such as ?New Normal?, ?Four Comprehensives? and ?Core Socialist Values? appeared, which cu-
mulatively constituted ?Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New 
Era?,?? which was incorporated into the Constitution of the Communist Party of China in October 
of ????.
?Chinese Dream? narrative is also externalized outwardly, depicted as ?the dream of man-
kind???. To tally with China?s increasingly active engagement in global affairs (such as Belt and 
Road Initiative), China designed the concept of ?a Community of Shared Future for Mankind?, 
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indicating that China will benefit the whole world via ?open, innovative, and inclusive develop-
ment?, ?cross-cultural exchanges?, etc.??
These strategic narratives shaped China?s national identity and diplomacy guideline. 
However, to affect mind and behavior of public outside China, after formation, strategic narratives 
need to be disseminated by political actors (projection) and received by targeted audiences (recep-
tion)??. In ????, Xi urged ?new concepts, new categories, and new formulations for communica-
tion? between China and other countries in pursuit of ?telling China?s story? and ?spreading 
China?s voice???. He then commanded the same instruction in several public occasions, for in-
stance, during his inspection to state media departments in February of ????, Xi reaffirmed that 
China needs to create ?flagship media with strong international influence? towards foreign audi-
ences, and told staff at China Central Television (CCTV)?s Washington headquarters to ?tell true 
stories of China???.
Accordingly, China facilitated the construction of international media network in worldwide, 
such as CCTV?s ??-hour English-language channel in the United States, establishment of China 
Global Television Network (CGTN) and State news agency Xinhua?s spreading news bureaus 
around the world??. Official accounts of these state media were also created in Youtube or other in-
ternational new media channels which are banned in China.
Such strategy and practice have long existed in China?s official system, which is termed as 
?discourse power?, or ?right to speak? (huayu quan)??. Chinese leaders believe that language has 
the power to ?transform the consciousness of a whole society???, thus they have paid great atten-
tion to maintaining the propaganda machine. Although China was successful in domestic informa-
tion control and ideology monopoly, its ?discourse power? was too weak in international forum 
comparing to its hard power, and the ?discourse power? in recent decades is even weaker than that 
in Mao?s era. In China?s narratives, China, whose image was always distorted by Western media, 
was the victim of West-dominated international communication. 
But now, with the rapid growth of its hard power, China gained more capability to project its 
own narratives against ?Western bias?. From China?s perspective, the intensive foreign propaganda 
activities are restoring China?s real image from ?China Threat? narratives and enhancing mutual 
understanding with foreign audiences. The construction of a favorable consensus environment, as 
China narrated, is beneficial for both China?s development and global peace & prosperity??. China 
intends to tell its story by its own voice, about the rise of a peaceful, responsible leading power in 
global governance, and thus win the respect to its politics, culture, and value from others.
These state-propped efforts to reshape China?s image, however, exerted limited effects to 
convince Western (or even domestic) audiences due to the lack of persuasion and attractiveness. 
Therefore, energetic projection but ineffective reception resulted in the seemingly ?sharpness? of 
China?s strategic narratives.
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Domestically, the effect of the ?Chinese Dream? narrative is still questionable. The narrative 
implicates the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in its unique way, the accessibility of every 
Chinese citizen?s individual dream, along with the resistance of outside influence on the state?s in-
ternal issues. Although it is hard to conduct reliable polls about official narrative in China due to 
strict censorship, some pieces of evidence can be found to show unsolid public support towards it. 
For example, in March of ????, an online survey about the ?Chinese Dream? slogan was carried 
out by the official website, People?s Forum. Regarding the question of whether they supported the 
leadership of CCP and believed in socialism, ??% (more than ?,???) respondents replied ?no?, and 
the page was then quickly deleted??.
Internationally, China?s soft-power-improvement projects also suffered criticism and doubts 
from the participants of these activities. The Guardian issued an in-depth investigative article in 
December of ???? about China?s overseas propaganda campaigns, arguing that ?telling China?s 
story well? is essentially Beijing?s ambition to ?redraw the global information order?. Some inter-
viewees, as former foreign employees served for China?s state-run international media (such as 
Xinhua News Agency and CCTV in South America), admitted that their jobs were somewhat like 
?combining journalism with a kind of creative writing?, and recognized themselves as ?soft propa-
ganda tools???. Moreover, a Canadian documentary film called ?In the Name of Confucius? went 
viral online in ????. It recorded the personal story of Sonia Zhao, an ex-employee of Confucius 
Institute at McMaster University as a Chinese language teacher. Zhao was dismissed by the 
Confucius Institute because of her clashing belief with regulations of the agent, leading to the first 
closure of a Confucius Institute on Northern America campus, and wild protests against the insti-
tute. The film criticized that Confucius Institutes were distilling the ?Culture of the Party (CCP)?, 
suppressing pluralistic voices but remaining only the Party?s unilateral narratives??.
From the evidence above, it is clear that China?s strategic narratives campaigns, though 
supported by strong economic power and firm ambitions, failed to fully convince even their do-
mestic audiences or direct participants, let alone the foreign targets. ?Keep a line between inside 
and outside of work? (nei wai you bie) is one of the CCP?s traditional propaganda principles, 
which implicated the inner censorship and outward target-specific communications. These years, 
however, with the growing confidence in its hard power and political system (e.g. ?Four 
Confidence?), as well as the relative decline of liberal values (e.g. Brexit), China is more coura-
geous to erase the line across domestic propaganda and overseas propaganda, by externalizing its 
internal narratives to outside world (?Telling China?s story well?). But apparently, by far it has 
not narrowed the gap successfully. Also, the active strategic narratives projections did not receive 
compromising receptions, but on the contrary, raised vigilance over China?s new propaganda 
campaigns in the West.
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2. Normative Power & Norm Diffusion: Humane Authority vs. Liberal Democracy
Different from ordinary (military) and civilian power, normative power can affect interna-
tional actors through the cognitive process. Norm diffusion is a ?transmission mechanism linking 
international norms to domestic change???. Informational diffusion? and ?cultural filter? are two 
factors that contribute to norm diffusion??.
The idea of normative power was initially created to discuss the identity of Europe. 
However, China is also evolving to a normative power with the practice of norm diffusion. Along 
with its rise, China is not satisfied with the role of a norm taker, but is also keen to be a norm mak-
er??. China has launched some normative challenge to western liberal order with its hard power, 
such as ?Beijing Consensus?, which is characterized by gradual reform and strong government, is 
encouraged by China to supplant ?Washington Consensus? (emphasizing liberal trade and demo-
cratic politics) for developing countries??.
China is not only attempting to portray itself as a successful template who?s able to achieve 
economic miracle without the transformation to democracy, but also broadening its norms with its 
cultural soft power??. Despite the historical burden that Chinese traditional culture used to be a tar-
get of revolution of CCP (especially in Mao?s era), ?confidence in our culture? proposed by Xi, 
added with the previous ?three confidences? (path, political systems, guiding theories), is now 
coined as the doctrine of ?Four Confidence? in CCP?s political official slogans.
In current China, there are three ideologies that affect decision-making: Marxism, economic 
pragmatism, and traditionalism??. Although in recent years, CCP reiterated Marxism?s guiding po-
sition in China?s ideological spectrum repeatedly, the party did not adopt it into foreign policy. 
Nowadays, China is combining Marxism with Chinese traditional culture in domestic politics, but 
in terms of diplomacy, only traditional culture is applied as a doctrine??.
China?s traditional culture is not only serving for the formation of Chinese national identity, 
but also for the potential China-led world order as the source of normative power. Xuetong Yan, 
the proposer of ?Moral Realism?, suggested that China?s traditional values, such as benevolence 
(ren), righteousness (yi) and rites (li) can be combined with selected liberal values of equality, de-
mocracy, and freedom, respectively, and produce new modern values of fairness, justice, and civil-
ity. Such modern values are superior to current West-dominant liberal values, for that reason, it is 
possible to shape a more desirable international normative order under the guidance of these mod-
ern values. The new norms, which are called ?Humane Authority? (wangdao) as a whole, can 
bring lasting peace and prosperity for all human society, which is an ideal community of ?harmony 
under heaven? inscribed in Chinese traditional culture??.
Yan also mentioned that there are two methods for a major state to align domestic ideology 
with international mainstream values: to revise its own ideology according to outsides or to uni-
versalize its native ideology to outsides –– and the latter is optimal for durable leading position??. 
In a similar sense, diffusing one?s norm would be more suitable than accepting other?s norm for an 
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energetic rising great power like China.
In preparation of becoming a de facto superpower in the new world order, besides global in-
fluence, China also needs to provide the substitute of current international norms. Before diffusing 
the new norms, which derive from Chinese traditional culture to a wide range of countries, the 
very first step is to let the culture pervasive worldwide. Supposedly, the spread of international-ex-
change entities like Confucius Institutes aims to promote foreign audiences? understanding of 
Chinese culture, cultivate their respect towards Chinese values, and thus smooth the process of ac-
cepting new norms offered by China. 
Such an ambitious, long-termed goal cannot be finished simply by tactic means of ?carrot? 
or ?stick?, thus the process of socialization within the foreign environment is also indispensable. 
However, its diffusion can be understood as ?penetration? by the targets, too, if the norms are still 
unconvincing or unacceptable enough even within China?s domestic context.
Specific reasons behind the failure of China?s norm diffusion towards Western targets (at least 
insofar) will not be discussed in this article, but a clear fact is: Chinese-led norms, as well as its cul-
ture (soft power),  are not universally welcomed by the Westerners yet. One of the strongest evi-
dence is exactly the emerge of ?sharp power?, which showed the undesirable response against 
China?s norms, perceiving them as unattractive authoritarian codes such as self-censorship and free-
dom restriction. Other proofs can be traced by attitudes towards China as a growing active partici-
pant in international norms. China?s Belt and Road Initiative? (BRI), for instance, is one of the most 
ambitious projects to wield the country?s smart power, and the best way to externalize China?s 
norms. The strategic initiative can serve as ?an umbrella for all Chinese investments outside the 
country? and ?the perfect vehicle to propagate China?s soft power strategy???. However, according to 
a Sputnik poll, in regards of China?s active international engagements exemplified by BRI, few pub-
lics in Western countries consider China as a ?partner?: UK (??%), Germany (??%), France (??%) 
and US (??%); and no more than ??% respondents from these four countries ?positively rating 
China?s actions in international arena???. Moreover, in ????, China?s position in global soft power 
rankings did not continue to rise as in previous years, conversely, it fell to ??th from ??th in ??????.
As a result, China?s norm diffusion actions will naturally be rejected for fear of the liberal 
order?s disruption and a following China-dominated unknown order. 
Conclusion 
To sum up, ?sharp power? is a flawed concept that lacks: clear boundary with hard power/
soft power, sufficient feature to distinguish it from smart power, and enough academic logic to re-




As for China?s influence-expansion behaviors, it is not necessary to create a new term to de-
fine a seemingly new issue. Besides the existing concept of ?smart power?, ?strategic narratives? 
and ?normative power/norm diffusion? are two potential explanatory tools. 
Under ?strategic narratives? assumption, China?s behaviors are essentially the grand strategy 
of projecting its influence through narratives in order to convince foreign audiences to accept 
China?s existence as a benign, responsible, peaceful rising power, and thus can reduce hostility to-
wards China?s domestic/international issue. This would benefit China?s development and, accord-
ing to its narratives, promote the peace and prosperity for all humankind. The feeling of ?sharp 
power? comes from the contradiction between a vigorous projection from China, and the poor re-
ception from its foreign audiences. 
Under ?norm diffusion? assumption, China?s actions can be understood as a socialization 
approach to preparing the construction of new global norms. As a rising normative power, China 
wishes to cultivate a sense of sympathy to its policy-instructing doctrine and source of potential 
norms –– Chinese traditional values –– in the international arena, and thereby make it easier for 
targeted countries to accept the consequence of China?s norm diffusion. Nevertheless, the incom-
plete norms would make the diffusion process look like ?penetration?, adding the risk of being la-
beled as ?sharp power?.
Beijing has realized the significance of soft power and is fervently building up its own stra-
tegic narratives and ready to diffuse its own norms. However, the creation of the term ?sharp pow-
er? reveals that its narratives and norms have not yet won the acceptance worldwide. To a great 
extent, the reason of China?s unsuccessful influence-expansion is the gap of its narratives/norms 
with the facts, which means: the inconsistency between what it claimed and what it really did, be-
tween domestic policy and foreign policy. If China is sincerely eager to realize its grand aims, 
maybe Nye?s advice is helpful, that is: ?to match words and deeds in their policies, be self-critical, 
and unleash the full talents of their civil societies???.
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